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Introduction 
Since devolution, the Scottish Government has 
progressively adopted a distinctive environmental and 
energy policy (Allan et al, 2008). This is expressed in two 
forms: first through setting emissions and renewables 
targets that differ from those set in the rest of the UK, and 
second by developing specific policies within the non-
reserved powers at its discretion. 
 
 The Climate Change (Scotland) Act includes a target to 
reduce CO2 emissions to 42% below 1990 levels by 2020. 
This is stricter than the 34% CO2 emissions reduction 
adopted by the UK Government. Moreover, the 
corresponding Scottish Government target for renewable 
electricity generation in 2020 is equivalent to 100% of 
electricity consumption in Scotland and preliminary data 
suggest that the interim 2011 target of 31% was exceeded 
by 4 percentage points. 
 
The powers under the Scottish Government’s control that it 
can use to affect energy outcomes include the judicious use 
of the planning system and additional funding for alternative 
renewable technologies in pre-commercial scales, such as 
the Wave and Tidal Energy Scheme (WATES), The Saltire 
Prize, and the Scottish Community and Households 
Renewables Initiative. 
 
Nevertheless, the Committee on Climate Change report into 
Scottish emissions targets concluded that with current 
policies and the current cap on emissions under the EU 
ETS, the Scottish Government’s target of a 42% CO2 
reduction will be missed, with emissions only falling by 38% 
on 1990 levels. 
 
It is clear that whilst Scotland has adopted challenging 
targets, many key policy instruments are reserved to the UK 
Government (Allan et al, 2008; McGregor et al, 2011). At 
present the main “green” elements of the tax system remain 
under Westminster control. This includes fuel duties, air 
passenger duty and the climate change levy. Also reserved 
to the UK Government are: the tax-transfer system; powers 
over the structure of the electricity market; Renewable 
Obligations Certificates, the Renewable Transport Fuels 
Obligation and the Renewable Heat Incentive; Climate 
Change Agreements; and the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment. 
 
Many economists regard a carbon tax as the most efficient 
way to reduce carbon emissions (Tullock, 1967; Pearce, 
1991). It is therefore of interest to consider the possibility of 
the Scottish Government’s adopting such a tax. This is 
particularly relevant given the present discussions 
concerning fiscal autonomy that are taking place around the 
Scotland Bill and the impending independence referendum 
in Scotland. In this paper we use an energy-economy-
environmental model of Scotland to simulate the impact of a 
Scottish specific tax on carbon emissions. The model 
quantifies the effect on carbon emissions and the level of 
aggregate economic activity in Scotland.  
 
Section 2 outlines the arguments for a carbon tax and 
introduces the notion of the double dividend. Section 3 
briefly describes the Scottish simulation model that we use. 
Section 4 gives the specific simulation set up. Section 5 
reports the simulation results and Section 6 is a short 
conclusion.  
 
General arguments for carbon tax 
Firms, households and governments generate emissions of 
CO2 that impose a cost on present and future generations 
in the form of global climate change.i  However, those who 
directly emit CO2 do not directly bear the cost of their own 
emissions. That is to say, they are not forced specifically to 
take these costs into account when they make production 
and consumption decisions. These costs are known 
generically as externalities and the notion that they can be 
internalised by the governments’ setting a tax equal to the 
marginal cost imposed on others was first suggested by 
Pigou (1920).  Coase (1960) persuasively argues that 
imposing appropriate property rights can also solve this 
problem. In this case, the owners of the right to pollute the 
atmosphere would charge for allowing individuals and 
organisations to emit CO2. This is the basis for the use of 
tradable permits for controlling emissions. However, the 
principles behind carbon taxes and carbon trading are 
fundamentally the sameii. A price should be set for emitting 
carbon, either through a specific tax or the requirement to 
acquire a permit. 
 
Essentially, the arguments that favour treating externalities 
in this way are similar to those that favour the use of free 
markets in general. They are an effective means of 
decentralised decision making. In this specific case, the 
government has set targets for the level of carbon 
emissions. However, this decentralised approach should 
lead to these targets being met at minimum cost in terms of 
consumption foregone. Setting a price on carbon emissions 
generates an appropriate set of incentives: individual 
governments, firms and consumers can decide how best to 
adjust to the increase in price. If there are possibilities to 
reduce the inputs of carbon then it is optimal for agents to 
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seek out and implement these reductions. Therefore firms 
will seek to adopt less emission intensive production 
techniques. The price of products that embody carbon 
emissions will rise. Therefore consumers will tend to 
consume less of these products. There is an increased 
incentive for technical change that involves reducing carbon 
emissions in the future. Therefore more resources will be 
channelled into generating sustainable technologies.  
 
However, there is an additional potential benefit from the 
use of carbon taxes. Carbon taxes (or tradeable permits, if 
owned by the state) are sources of revenue for the 
governmentiii. This additional revenue can be used to 
reduce other taxes that generate distortions in the operation 
of the economy, thereby producing a so-called ‘double 
dividend’. Here, not only are CO2 emissions reduced (the 
first dividend), but the efficiency with which other elements 
of the economy operate can be simultaneously improved 
(the second dividend). There is an extensive literature 
concerning the possible nature of this second dividend and 
the conditions under which it existsiv. The most popular 
formulation suggests a cut in the taxes on employment. The 
reduction in the price of labour to the firm produces a net 
reduction in costs to labour intensive firms, and encourages 
the substitution of labour for other inputs in all production. 
This may increase employment and in almost all economies 
such labour market improvements are highly valued, 
particularly under present circumstances.   
 
 
Table 1:   Impact of implementing a £50 per tonne carbon tax in Scotland on key macro-variables: 
Percentage change from base year values 
 
  
Externally recycled Internally recycled Internally recycled 
  
Public expenditure Income tax 
  Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run 
CO2 Emissions -32.66 -39.34 -32.55 -38.84 -31.83 -37.49 
GDP -0.30 -2.68 -0.14 -1.37 0.26 0.83 
Unemployment Rate 4.08 0.00 1.79 0.00 -3.77 0.00 
Total Employment -0.45 -2.60 -0.20 -1.27 0.42 1.06 
Nominal Gross Wage -0.60 0.81 0.24 0.81 -0.88 -1.43 
Real Wage After Tax -0.45 0.00 -0.20 0.00 0.43 0.00 
Replacement Cost of Capital -0.26 0.63 0.50 0.63 0.07 -0.36 
Labour Supply 0.00 -2.60 0.00 -1.27 0.00 1.06 
Household Consumption -0.90 -1.68 -0.56 -0.87 1.18 1.45 
Govt. Consumption - - 4.66 3.97 - - 
Income Tax Rate - - - - -6.16 -5.37 
Capital Stock 0.00 -2.82 0.00 -1.53 0.00 0.40 
Export 0.14 -1.23 -0.55 -1.23 -0.29 0.05 
 
 
The AMOS model for Scotland When the model is run in a period-by period mode, the 
population and the capital stock are upgraded between 
periods. We incorporate flow equilibrium migration, where 
net immigration is positively related to the Scottish real 
wage and negatively related to the unemployment rate.  
Investment is determined by profit maximizing behaviour, 
with an assumed internationally integrated capital market. 
The model can be solved in either myopic or forward-looking 
mode. In the first case agents use adaptive expectations so 
that they abstract from future periods, while in the second 
case firms and consumers have perfect foresight and react 
optimally to anticipated future events. Except where 
explicitly stated the model is run here with perfect foresight.  
In this paper we explore and quantify the impact of 
introducing energy taxation to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions in Scotland. To do this we use AMOSENVI, a 
multi-sectoral energy-economy-environment computable 
general equilibrium model for the Scotland developed for 
policy analysis by the Fraser of Allander Institute. The model 
has 17 industry sectors: 13 are energy sectors, of which 9 
are forms of electricity generation. Production is 
characterized by cost minimization with standard, well-
behaved production functions. Firms sell output in 
competitive markets and household consumption is 
dependent on the population level, average income and 
consumer prices. In the simulations performed here wage 
setting follows a bargaining procedure where the real wage 
is inversely related to the unemployment rate.  
 
Simulation set up 
The simulations impose a tax on carbon emissions 
generated in production. This is achieved by introducing an  
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Figure 1:  The short and long-run percentage change in sectoral output for a £50 per tonne tax on CO2 
emissions with revenue recycling through a reduction in income tax     
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Change in total CO2 emissions for a £50 per tonne tax on carbon emissions for all three forms of 
revenue recycling 
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differentiated according to the carbon content of each fuel. 
The tax is imposed in the first period and maintained at a 
constant rate. The model is run forward with no other 
changes until we reach a new long-run equilibrium. 
 
The tax generates revenue for the public sector. We run 
three simulations that differ in the way in which these funds 
are recycled. In one simulation the revenues revert to the 
UK Government and are spent outwith Scotland. In the 
other two simulations, the funds are used in Scotland. In 
one the revenues are recycled through an expansion in 
government expenditure. In the other the revenues are used 
to reduce the tax on labour.  
 
The Scottish Government’s target is to reduce CO2 
emissions by 42% in 2020, compared to the total in 1990. 
Our model is calibrated for the year 2000. Because there 
had already been some reduction in emissions in the 
decade leading up to 2000, to achieve the Scottish target 
requires a 37% reduction of CO2 emissions in the 20 years 
to 2020. By trial and error, simulation indicates that the 
target can be met by a carbon tax of £50 per tonne of CO2. 
 
Simulation results  
Table 1 reports results for key economic variables for the 
simulations with each of the three forms of revenue 
recycling. Figures are presented for the short and the long 
run. The short-run results give the impact in period one. In 
this period capacity constraints are imposed so that both 
capital and labour supplies are fixed to their base-year 
value. The long-run results apply where all supply 
constraints are relaxed, so that both capital and the labour 
supply are free to adjust totally. In all three cases the 
introduction of the carbon tax is able to substantially reduce 
CO2 emissions. The 37% CO2 reduction target is met with a 
very rapid adjustment even in the first period. However, the 
impacts on the aggregate activity variables, GDP and total 
employment, are much smaller and their sign depends on 
how the tax revenues are recycled. 
 
Where the tax revenue is externally recycled the carbon tax 
clearly has a depressing effect on the Scottish economy. 
The cost of fuels used in production has increased and this 
has a contractionary impact. Initially this contraction is 
generated by a fall in household consumption, and there is 
actually some crowding in of exports. However, in the long 
run there is an increase in nominal wages as workers 
attempt to maintain their real wages and exports fall, 
together with household consumption, as competitiveness is 
reduced. The GDP decreases by 0.3% in the short run and 
2.68% in the long run. Employment initially declines by more 
than GDP, as labour is more flexible than capital in the short 
run, thereby producing a short-run rise in unemployment of 
4.1%. But the impact of outmigration, triggered by the 
adverse local labour market conditions, means that in the 
long run the unemployment rate moves back to its original 
level. However, in this time interval the labour force, and 
therefore also employment, has been reduced by 2.6%, just 
less than the fall in GDP. 
For the case where revenues are recycled through 
increased Scottish Government expenditure, the net effect 
on aggregate economic activity is again contractionary. In 
this simulation there is an increase in public expenditure of 
4.66% in the short-run and 3.97% in the long-run, funded by 
the additional carbon tax revenues. However, this 
expenditure stimulus is not able totally to offset the negative 
supply side effects of the increase in energy taxation. In this 
case the long-run fall in GDP and employment are 1.37% 
and 1.27% respectively. The increase in public spending 
only goes some way to mitigating the adverse supply side 
effects of the tax. However, it is important to remember that 
in this case the Scottish population do benefit from an 
increased supply of public goods. 
 
A qualitatively different outcome for the overall economy is 
obtained if the carbon tax revenues are used to reduce the 
tax on labour. In our model this takes the form of a reduction 
in income tax, which falls in both the short and the long run 
by 6.16% and 5.37% respectively. This would be within the 
range of income tax variation proposed in the Scotland Bill. 
The net impact on the Scottish economy is positive, 
resulting in an increase in GDP and household consumption 
in both time periods. The expansion in economic activity 
reduces unemployment in the short run by 3.77%. The 
resulting immigration increases the labour supply, again 
pulling the real wage and the unemployment rate back to 
their base year value.  
 
This result indicates that under the circumstances assumed 
in this simulation, the implementation of such a revenue-
neutral set of tax changes not only reduces CO2 emissions 
but also stimulates economic activity and jobs. Employment 
increases by 0.42% in the short run and 1.06% in the long 
run. In this scenario the percentage change in employment 
is greater than the percentage change in GDP in both of the 
time frames shown here. The increase in the real wage in 
the short run stimulates household consumption, with some 
crowding out of exports. However, in the long run nominal 
wages fall, with the labour supply and competitiveness 
rising, so that increased household consumption and 
exports drive the expansion in the economy.  
 
In Figure 1 we report the short and the long-run changes in 
sectoral output where the revenue is recycled through 
reduced income taxes. Of course the introduction of the 
carbon tax directly increases the price of coal, oil and gas 
when these are used as an input in production.  The 
demand for these fuels falls, reducing dramatically their 
production and import levels. Electricity supply increases in 
the short run, as a result of the small increase in economic 
activity. However, in the long run, when there has been a full 
adjustment to the new prices, electricity supply falls. There 
is, however, a significant increase in electricity generated 
from renewable energy. The share of electricity generated 
by renewables increases in the long run by slightly more 
than 42%, reflecting also the large fall in output in the coal 
and gas electricity generation sectors. As for the non-energy
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Figure 3:  % reduction in total CO2 emissions for a £50 per tonne tax with revenue recycling through a 
reduction in income tax. A comparison between myopic and perfect foresight agents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  The short and long-run % reductions in sectoral CO2 emissions for a £50 tonne tax with revenue 
recycling through a reduction in income tax 
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sectors, only the primary sector shows a long-run reduction 
in output.  
 
In Figure 2, we show the period-by-period reduction in CO2 
emissions from the base period. Note that for all three 
shocks the carbon tax is able to achieve the 37% target 
emissions reduction by the year 2020. This target is met 
after only 5 years when the revenue is either externally 
recycled or used to increase public expenditure within 
Scotland. With revenue recycling through a reduction in 
Scottish income tax, the target is achieved after ten years. 
 
All the simulations reported up to now have incorporated 
forward-looking behaviour on the part of all agents. In Figure 
3 we compare the period-by-period impact of the carbon tax 
on the level of CO2 emissions under both forward looking 
and myopic assumptions. Again we report the percentage 
change from base year values of total CO2 emissions for 
the simulations where the carbon tax revenue is used to 
reduce income tax. As we would intuitively expect, both the 
myopic and forward-looking model reach the same long-run 
equilibrium, regardless of the dynamic structure. However, 
whilst with perfect foresight the target is achieved in less 
than ten years, with the myopic model we are only able to 
reach the target by 2025.  
 
This has implications for the need for credibility in the 
implementation of the environmental policy by the Scottish 
Government. In order that agents can optimally adjust to 
policy by anticipating its future effects, those agents must 
believe that the policy will be maintained in the future. In the 
myopic case, the agents have adaptive expectations. They 
adjust only with respect to present prices and outputs. The 
adjustment is much slower without this commitment to the 
future.  
 
In Figure 4 we show the short-run and long-run change in 
CO2 emissions at the sectoral level (for those sectors that 
emit carbon). Note that there are huge reductions in 
emissions in all energy sectors. In the long run, the 
reductions in the coal and the coal electricity generation 
sectors are 70% and 79% respectively. As for the non-
energy sectors the biggest reductions in emissions are in 
the manufacturing and the service sectors, which are the 
most energy-intensive sectors. 
 
Conclusions 
There is no doubt about the level of ambition of the Scottish 
Government’s emissions targets; but there must be some 
doubt about whether it has sufficient policy instruments 
under its direct control to induce households and firms to 
behave in a way that ensures these targets are met. Yet this 
is the challenge that the Scottish Government faces in the 
context of liberalised energy markets. While credibility is 
enhanced by enshrining emissions targets in a legal 
framework, this is generally insufficient to ensure their 
satisfaction (McGregor et al, 2011).  
 
The debate on constitutional change continues to gain 
momentum in the run up to the referendum on 
independence. However, regardless of the outcome of that 
debate, the Scottish Government is destined to benefit from 
a significant enhancement in the extent of its fiscal powers. 
Against this background, it seems natural to consider the 
possibility of a Scottish-specific carbon tax. It seems natural 
because: this would be a genuine option under both devo 
max and independence. Such a tax is focused on the “bad” 
of emissions directly and if implemented in a fiscally neutral 
way offers the potential of a double dividend if the revenues 
are used to subsidise (or more realistically reduce the tax 
on) the “good” of employment. Our simulations demonstrate 
that a carbon tax could simultaneously stimulate 
employment while reducing emissions: the double dividend. 
 
We end on a cautionary note. Our analysis is still in a 
preliminary stage, and we plan more extensive systematic 
analysis of the factors that govern both the direction and the 
scale of the Scottish economy’s response to a carbon tax. 
Furthermore, extensions to explore the impact on the 
economy of the rest-of-the UK would also be of 
considerable policy interest. However, the estimates we 
present here are by no means an upper bound for the 
potential beneficial impacts of the tax for, in the longer term, 
we would expect the tax to stimulate innovation in low-
carbon technologies, a positive effect that is absent from our 
current analysis. Furthermore, in current circumstances, it 
may be thought desirable to focus the good news by 
recycling revenues to subsidise employment among the 
younger age groups who have been most adversely 
impacted by the recession and its aftermath. We believe 
that our initial investigations are sufficiently promising to 
merit more extensive analysis of a Scottish carbon tax. 
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